Abstract: This study examined the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. The study used a cross-sectional data for the year 2013 of 41 firms listed on Bahrain Bourse. Multiple regression approach was incorporated. The study found that the governance level was 47.1%. Voluntary disclosure percentage was found to be 51.1% in Bahrain Bourse which is considered high compared to previous studies. The results of the study test indicate that there is a positive relationship between the principals: ownership of the largest shareholder, size of the board of directors and independency of board of directors with voluntary disclosure, and that there is no relationship between ownership of the three largest shareholders and voluntary disclosure. 
Introduction
Corporate governance represents the centre of attention especially in the past decade as many scandals taking place in the US and Europe (Gandia, 2008) . Some of these scandals that have shaken the capital market are Enron in 2001 , Lehman Brothers in 2008 and Satyam in 2009 . Those famous corporate accounting scandals have shown failures and weaknesses in corporate governance (Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; Mousa and Desoky, 2012) . MacMillan et al. (2004) define corporate governance as the instrument which guides and manages organisations. It is argued that good implemented corporate governance can help with the company's internal control and therefore initiate good decision making, however, weak corporate governance can be the reason for investors losing confidence in the corporation as well as the existence of agency problems (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009) .
Corporate governance mostly aims at protecting the interest of all participants in the organisation and can specifically benefits them through the increase of disclosing information which gives the firm a higher value and leads to lower irregular information (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009 ). Essentially, the call for corporate governance arises when separation exists among the owners of the company and the management. Corporate managers take some self-beneficial decisions in what is called an agency problem, which the shareholders and stakeholders bear the costs of those actions known as agency costs, therefore, in order to cut those costs and lessen the damage, a system must be present to regulate the executive actions and maintain the shareholders best interest known as the corporate governance (Larcker and Tayan, 2011) . Corporate governance can be defined as the relationship between the shareholders, the board of directors, as well as the stakeholders (Ho and Taylor, 2013) . Larcker and Tayan (2011) also define corporate governance as the mechanism that the company adopts in order to stop and avoid those self-interest acts by the management that will raise agency costs and negatively affect the benefits of the shareholders. When it comes to management decision making in a company, information is key. Therefore, it is crucial that a method of provisioning of information is implemented. That is where voluntary disclosure comes into play. In fact voluntary disclosure is argued to be considered one of the important elements of corporate governance (Hassan, 2013; Al-Janadi et al., 2013) .
The government of the Kingdom of Bahrain is eager to encourage good corporate governance principals for the purpose of improving the confidence of investors and add to the economy of the country. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce in the Kingdom of Bahrain with the collaboration of the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) has worked with the National Corporate Governance Committee in order to craft and introduce the Corporate Governance Code of Bahrain in 2010 after reviewing over 25 domestic and national corporate governance company's codes in a way that suits the economic environment of Bahrain (Bahrain Code of Corporate Governance, 2010; Ramadhan, 2012) . The National Corporate Governance Committee consists of audit firms, governmental organisations, educational institutions and other participates of the business environment.
The code was firstly implemented in January 2011 and all companies in the kingdom were expected to adopt the code whether they were public or private (Bahrain Code of Corporate Governance, 2010) . The Corporate Governance Code of Bahrain comprises of nine principals that stick to global best practice. The code contains proposals to put into practice those principals of corporate governance. The code is also subject to 'comply or explain' structure which suggests that companies in the Kingdom of Bahrain should obey and comply with the code, otherwise provide a clarification on why compliance is not being executed (Bahrain Code of Corporate Governance, 2010) . The code is believed to be an energetic manuscript that could be developed and altered over time as a result of the changing conditions locally and internationally. Those alterations could be made based on meetings and discussions with a variety of stakeholders (Bahrain Code of Corporate Governance, 2010) . For observing the implementation of this code, Bahrain Code of Corporate Governance (2010) stated that disclosure and transparency are fundamental parts, nevertheless, disclosure is not sufficient to ensure compliance with the code, therefore the government of Bahrain has a combined system in order to assure the effective compliance, the associated bodies included are: the board of directors, shareholders, Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MOIC), CBB, Bahrain Bourse, Bahrain courts and professional institutions (lawyers, auditors etc.) Bahrain's Corporate Governance Code states that corporations must be led by an efficient and collaborative and well informed board of directors; directors and executives shall be loyal to the corporation, the board must be in full control over financial, audit and internal control and their obedience with law, corporations must have specific procedures on appointing, training and evaluating the board, rewarding executives and employees fairly, the board shall craft and effective and efficient management organisation, the board must correspond properly with shareholders and persuade their contribution, corporation must reveal its corporate governance, and finally Islamic corporations must pursue the principals of Islamic Shari'a.
Voluntary disclosure has grown to be an important factor to the participants of the capital market (Bouaziz, 2014) . It is when the organisation willingly provides financial and non-financial information about itself that is not required by the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the company's commercial law. This information mostly focuses on the executives and members of the board of directors (Ho and Taylor, 2013) . Ho and Taylor (2013) also argue that an organisation with strong corporate governance is likely to disclose more information to their shareholders. Corporations are becoming more complex, therefore, voluntary disclosure is being welcomed in corporations for being a tool to lessen the information gap between shareholders and the management as information gaps eventually lead to false conclusions and improper decisions by investors (Schuster and O'Connell, 2006) . Lim et al. (2007) argue that since most corporations use shares as a type of incentive to their inside managers; managers are then bound to voluntarily disclose information since their self-interest will be parallel to shareholders interest. Schuster and O'Connell (2006) , also argue that voluntary disclosure is prone to reduce the cost of capital as investors begin to trust the corporation more, and therefore attract more investors.
Research problem
The theory supporting this study is the agency theory which will measure the study hypotheses regarding the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in the companies listed in Bahrain Bourse. Many previous studies have employed the theoretical framework of the agency theory in their research (Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; Bouaziz, 2014; Gandia, 2008; Saha and Akter, 2011) . The agency theory suggests that the corporate control system should influence the organisations' environment in order to constrain the conflict of interest practiced by the management. Managers can feel the absence of governance, therefore they gradually start taking independent decisions and eventually those decisions turn into self-beneficial decisions where they start concealing critical information from shareholders. A strong corporate governance implementation is needed in order to cease those kinds of decisions which in turn lead to incurring agency costs, hence agency problems. Bahrain Bourse is considered a very small market compared to others in the region, however it is not dominated by family owned businesses which tend to hold information from the public (Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010) . Bahrain has continued to record significant economic growth despite a number of challenges faced in recent years; furthermore, Bahrain's long history of economic openness has led to a high degree of integration in the global economy (Bahrain Economic Development Board, 2013) .
The Kingdom of Bahrain has proven itself as a vital financial hub in the global economy, however, for it to remain at that level and step forward, a mechanism such as corporate governance should be present and strongly implemented in order to regulate businesses and prevent agency problems and thus increase voluntary disclosure.
The questions that the study will attempt to answer are as follows: What is the level of corporate governance code on the listed companies in Bahrain Bourse? What is the level of voluntary disclosure by the listed companies in Bahrain Bourse? What is the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in the listed companies in Bahrain Bourse?
Research objectives
The study's main objective is to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure with evidence from the listed companies in Bahrain Bourse. Although studies in the same field have been scarce in the Middle East region and specifically the Arabian Gulf; nevertheless, there have been studies in Kuwait (2008 and , a study in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (2012) and a study in Saudi Arabia (2013) . Addressing this study in one of the Middle Eastern countries is worth an exceptional attention since organisations in this region tend to be less transparent and motivated to disclose information compared to organisations in the US, Europe and Australia (Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010) . Investors, shareholders, managers, creditors, as well as debtors in the Kingdom of Bahrain are expected to benefit from the study as it will address the listed companies in the Bahrain Bourse in various sectors. Knowing the degree of transparency of those companies can help investors and shareholders make better investment decisions and help the company itself with addressing the different gaps and shortcomings and therefore cut costs and even prevent fraudulent acts.
Aims of the study
This research aims to investigate the relationship of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure by providing evidence from listed companies in Bahrain Bourse. The study also aims to find the extent of disclosing voluntary information by the listed companies in Bahrain as well as finding the most influential corporate governance factors on voluntary disclosure. The study aims to: Study the extent of disclosing voluntary information by the listed companies in Bahrain Bourse. Evaluate the level of corporate governance principals in the listed companies in the Bahrain Bourse. Investigate the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in the listed companies in Bahrain Bourse.
Literature review
Corporate governance can be defined as the system that regulates the business behaviour and balances the interest of shareholders and stakeholders in order to build a healthy and efficient business environment and generate profit for the corporation (Li et al., 2014) . It can also be defined as the mechanism, customs, guidelines, practices and regulations that decide how a firm should operate (Olasanmi and Akinkoye, 2014) . Corporate governance has a good impact on the future of the world (Starbuck, 2014) .
Due to various scandals taking place worldwide; corporate governance comes in order to ensure the board of directors that managers are acting solely in the shareholders' best interest (Zeitoun et al., 2015) . However, the authors also argue that corporate governance not only tries to ensure the shareholders best interest and protect their wealth but moreover create new wealth and the fair distribution among shareholders.
Corporate governance is basically providing a secure environment which is attractive to investors (Todorovic, 2013 ) the author also argues that a good practice of corporate governance can enhance investors' confidence in the corporation. It was found in previous studies that 84% of worldwide institutional investors are keen to pay a premium for a well governed corporation than a poor one (Youssef, 2010) , therefore investors' confidence will lead to a better decision making as well as lessen the cost of capital and persuade steady resource of funding. There are no generally-agreed-upon standards which ascertain good corporate governance (Larcker and Tayan, 2011) . Jakada and Inusa (2014) argue that the absence of proper practice of corporate governance led to fraudulent acts in Nigeria which caused the collapse of the stock market and the obvious abuse of loans in the banking sector. The authors also claim that that occurred due to investors in corporations having less control in governance and management.
Corporate governance goes beyond the relationship between the board of directors and management; it also includes the relationship between the board of directors, management, shareholders and stakeholders (Youssef, 2010) . Zeitoun et al. (2015) and Jizi et al. (2013) , suggest that for a strong corporate governance, the board of directors should not only act as the agents of shareholders and protect their interest but also protect the interest of stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, debtors and creditors, since stakeholders are an essential part to the company's value, and most of those stakeholders and exposed to being miss leaded. Olasanmi and Akinkoye (2014) stated that the objectives of corporate governance are to enhance the value of shareholders as well as keeping in consideration the interest of stakeholders.
A good corporate governance practice helps ensure that the corporation environment is fair and clear, moreover, companies can be held responsible for their decisions and actions. However on the other hand, a weak corporate governance practice can lead to waste resources, negligence and fraud (Youssef, 2010) .
The significance of corporate governance
Corporate governance has been proven to be an important instrument in the business sector as many researches directed their attention towards corporate governance tools, mechanisms, importance, as well as its relationship with firms' performance, creative accounting, financial reporting, corporate social responsibility, as well as its relationship with risk and return. There have been many fraudulent acts taking place and various places worldwide, where managers and employees with the connivance of auditors started to manipulate financial statements causing the collapse of firms globally due to creative accounting practices (Donwa and Odia, 2013) . According to the authors, in 1990 Nigeria has witnessed the collapse of major banks (Savanna Bank and African International Bank) due to fraudulent acts, manipulation and creative accounting practices. The scandal involved five CEO's from the Nigerian Central Bank. Financial statements and reporting are usually a tool to investors to ease the decision making process, however when those financial statements are manipulated in order to suit managers satisfactions. Those previously mentioned acts can occur when the firm has a weak internal control and most importantly when the firm has a weak corporate governance practice (Donwa and Odia, 2013) . Manipulating accounting rules is primarily a receptive spot of corporate governance (Blake and Salas, 2001) .
Numerous researchers have directed their attention towards the impact of corporate governance on the firms' financial performance as corporate governance is widely seen as the system by which the business is directed and controlled (Dharmadasa et al., 2014) . It is true that corporate governance ensures the safeguard of shareholders, managers, employees, and basically all the market participants, however, it is also a structure that allocates the rights and responsibilities of managers and employees among other participants in the corporation as well as spelling out the rules and regulations for proper decision making in relation to the corporate affairs, therefore assuring that goals and objectives are set and gradually walking towards attaining them (Thuraisingam, 2013) .
Voluntary disclosure and the agency theory
Good corporate governance must assist competent, effectual and powerful managers that are able to convey value to shareholders in the long run. According to the agency theory, managers control and manipulate information in order to enhance their freedom area in decision making and therefore prevent the shareholders level of control. As a result of that these decisions eventually cause agency problems and thus incur agency costs (Bouaziz, 2014) and also create the movement of wealth from shareholders to managers. According to Saha and Akter (2011) , managers with ownership percentage in the corporation tend to conceal information or disclose less information from shareholders, contradicting Lim et al. (2007) statement of managerial incentives leading to more transparency by the managers, which makes more sense. The agency theory suggests that a mechanism must be present in order to regulate managers' behaviour and have them act in the shareholders favour (Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010) . Voluntary disclosure and the foundation of corporate boards are known of being the main influential mechanisms that considerably affect and reduce the costs arising from concealing and manipulating information related to the agency problem (El-Chaarani, 2014) . In other words, the stronger the corporate governance being implemented, the higher the voluntary disclosure, therefore the less agency costs incurred.
The relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure
Several researchers have devoted their attention to measuring the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in Canada (2014), France (2013) , Malaysia (2009 ), Spain (2008 and Bangladesh (2013 ), China (2008 ), Iran (2010 . However, studies in the same field have been scarce in the Middle East region and specifically the Arabian Gulf; nevertheless, there has been studies in Kuwait (2010) , in the UAE (2012) and in Saudi Arabia (2013). Oluwagbemiga (2014) conducted a study in Nigeria to measure the importance of voluntary disclosure on the financial statements of listed companies in Nigeria, among the importance of it on investors' decisions as well. The extent of voluntary disclosure contributes to investors taking critical decisions (Khodadadi, 2010) . Oluwagbemiga (2014) argues that the existence of agency problems raise the demand of voluntary disclosure, furthermore, the author concluded that voluntary disclosure does in fact positively affects investors decision making and is significant to listed companies financial performance in Nigeria. When managers choose to voluntarily disclose information to investors and the public, they are consequently seeking to develop the investors' insight of the firms' value. Investors' perception is highly important especially when the firm is trying to access the capital market (Beyer and Guttman, 2012) . Managers will mostly disclose information in order to boost the firms' stock prices, or when it involves the allocation of capital but on the other hand withhold other information (Kumar et al., 2012) . Kumar et al. (2012) argue that managers not only disclose good information but surprisingly also bad information to attain investment efficiency. The authors also argue that the response for disclosing bad information is stronger than the response for disclosing good information. Voluntary disclosure has some certain qualities. First of all, annual or quarterly financial statements are not the only financial communication channels when it comes to voluntary disclosure. Some companies adopted other methods of communications such as annuals meetings and conferences, press releases, meetings with shareholders and financial analysts in addition to the firms' annual report. Second of all, disclosing information is a quantitative and qualitative scenery in which can be both financial and non-financial. Nevertheless, providing voluntary information regarding financial reports does not include info related to marketing and public relations, however, it is solely restricted to the financial, economic and monetary situations (Bouaziz, 2014) . Bouaziz (2014) also pointed out several advantages to voluntary financial disclosure; some of them are: It gives managers the ability to expect any economic changes, makes investors anticipations in line with managers' expectations, alleviate unfavourable financial market reactions when it comes to bad news, attract new investors and thus new capital and diminishes the cost of capital.
Corporate governance is defined as the mechanism that protects shareholders interest from improper managers behaviour in the corporation, while voluntary disclosure is defined as the procedure in while information regarding a current condition, an action or a decision is made available, accessible and understandable (Morris et al., 2011) , the authors also argue that the limitations and relationship between the two concepts is disconcerted and that corporate governance and voluntary disclosure are two complementary concepts (Morris et al., 2011) .
Evidence from previous studies
Hassan (2012) has conducted a study to measure the impact of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure through the listed corporations in the UAE. The study utilised the published financial statements of 95 listed companies of several sectors. The study found that the listed companies in the UAE tend to be less transparent when it comes to disclosing information regarding the external auditing and the audit committee, while on the other hand, those companies tend to be more transparent when it comes to disclosing information regarding the management structure. Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) who conducted the same study on 170 listed Kuwaiti companies in Kuwait by identifying four major corporate governance characteristics and then used univariate and multivariate regression analyses to measure the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. The study also utilised a voluntary disclosure measuring index which was used in various previous studies. The index was adjusted by the authors to suite the requirements of the Kuwaiti listed companies. The study results indicate that the audit committee has a positive relation on voluntary disclosure. The study also took into consideration some control variables such as the company size, leverage and auditors type. Barros et al. (2013) argue that there are certain main drivers for corporate disclosure such as ownership, board of directors, audit quality and audit committee. Along their research in finding the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in France, the authors suggested that a good disclosure policy can help the corporation with cutting agency costs. The research utilised 206 non-financial listed companies in France, which resulted in finding evidence that voluntary disclosure increases when the company has independent audit committee and board of directors, as well as managerial ownership and a good external audit quality. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) conducted a study to examine the importance of corporate governance and some environmental factors such as age and education as possible determinants of voluntary disclosure in Malaysia via 167 listed corporations. The aim of the study was to improve the understanding of persuades that help clarify voluntary disclosure in developing countries in which governments are interested in corporate governance issues and cultural aspects. The regression analysis used indicated that there is in fact a relationship between two corporate governance variables which are the non-executive director and the authority of a family member on the board and the degree of voluntary disclosure. Saha and Akter (2013) also measured the relationship between voluntary disclosure and several aspects of the corporate governance with the aid of 40 listed companies in the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) in Bangladesh in which 20 of those companies were financial and the remaining 20 were non-financial. In order to evaluate the level of voluntary disclosure, the authors utilised the voluntary disclosure index developed specifically to suite the environmental requirements in Bangladesh. The authors concluded that financial corporations reveal more information voluntarily than non-financial corporations. The analysis also pointed out a negative relationship between voluntary disclosure and percentage of equity held by insiders. On the other hand, it was found that the firms' size and profitability have a significantly positive relationship in contrast with voluntary disclosure. However, and on the contrary to Barros et al. (2013) findings, Saha and Akter (2013) found no relationship between voluntary disclosure and the audit committee, as well as the board size, the percentage of equity held by other institutions, and the level of independent directors on the board.
Moreover, in order to determine the impact of corporate governance and voluntary disclosure, Qi and Li (2008) established a study utilising the financial reports of 100 listed Chinese companies. The authors employed the voluntary disclosure index in order to measure the level of voluntary disclosure. The findings of the study revealed that companies with high managerial ownership tend to have higher voluntary disclosure as managers will be more concerned and worried about the company's financial condition. Khodadadi et al. (2010) examined the relationship of corporate governance (attribute to the percentage of independent directors on board, the existence of a dominant person duality and corporate investors) and voluntary disclosure selecting 106 companies of Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) in Iran. The authors defined the size of the corporation and the type of the auditor as control variables. The study concluded with no significant relationship between the percentage of independent directors on board and the existence of a dominant person duality with voluntary disclosure, while on the other hand the study results demonstrated a relationship between corporate investors and voluntary disclosure. Al-Janadi et al. (2013) main objectives was to determine the impact of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on voluntary disclosure from 87 listed companies in the Saudi Stock Exchange. The authors developed an index to measure the level of voluntary disclosure which was divided into three categories (corporate governance information, financial information, and environmental information) and unlike previous studies, used three levels for measurement (2 if entirely disclosed; 1if faintly disclosed, and 0 if not disclosed). The control variables taken into consideration are the firms' size, profitability, financial sector, industrial sector and service. The descriptive statistics utilised concluded that corporate governance mechanisms have a significant relationship in providing voluntary disclosure.
Research methodology

Study population sample and resources of data:
The study sample covered are the listed Bahraini companies in Bahrain Bourse which are 47 companies from various sectors; those sectors are banking, investment, insurance, services, industrial, hotel and tourism sectors along with closed companies and other non-Bahraini companies. The data was collected from the investors' guide by Bahrain Bourse and companies annual reports based on the following conditions: 1 All data is available.
2 The company did not merge with another company or have been liquidated during the current study period.
According to Bahrain Bourse 2013 annual report, the Bourse includes two closed companies and four non-Bahraini companies which were eliminated from the study sample due to lacking of sufficient information. As a result, after eliminating six companies, the final study sample became 41 companies which signify 87.23% of the inventive study sample. Table 1 summarises the study sample selection.
Measurement of variables
The following Table 1 summarises the measurement of the dependent, independent and control variables. 
Study model
In order to measure the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure; the study estimates the following linear regression model: 
Data analysis and testing of hypothesis
The current section contains three parts. The first part will hold testing the validity of data utilised in the research. While the second part will include the descriptive analysis followed by the third part which will hold testing the hypothesis and the empirical analysis. The aim of this study is to find the relationship between the corporate governance and voluntary disclosure with evidence from Bahrain Bourse. Throughout the research, it was noticed that most of the previous studies measuring the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure concluded that there's either a positive relationship between the two variables or no relationship whatsoever. Consequently, the study's hypothesis can be formed as follows:
H 0 There is no relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure.
H a There is a positive relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure.
Validity of data
Using the general linear model (GLM); certain conditions must apply first before applying the model. To test the validity of data, four tests were conducted: normal distribution test, multicollinearity test, autocorrelation test and homoscedasticity test.
Normal distribution test
Testing the normality of data was conducted using Jarque-Bera test or in other words, the goodness of fit. Table 2 recapitulates the tests results in order to validate the data normality. The results illustrate that the variables which are the company's age and the financial leverage are normally distributed as the p-value appears to be more than 0.050 as well as skewness closer to zero and Kurtosis closer to 2. On the other hand, the variables which are the company size and the market capitalisation are not normally distributed as the p-value appears to be less than 0.050. In order to conquer this problem; the natural logarithm of these variables was taken. 
Multicollinearity test
The reliance and strength of the GLM depends on the independency of each variable of the independent and control variables applied in the model. If this condition was not fulfilled; the linear model is considered to be invalid and cannot be applied and used. To test the independency of the independent and control variables, collinearity diagnostics test was employed by measuring the tolerance of each variable and then finding the variance inflation factor (VIF) which measures the impact of correlation between the independent variables. If the value of the VIF is more than 10, then there is a problem with the multicollinearity of the measured variable (Gujarati, 2003) . However, in Table 3 , it is noticed that the VIF value is less than 10 for all the independent and control variables, which indicates that the study model does not suffer from multicollinearity problem. Furthermore, the independent variables "duality of chairman and CEO posts and property of managers" were excluded from the validity test and testing of hypothesis as the former was found to be 100% complied, while the latter was found 98% not complied. 
Autocorrelation test
Autocorrelation problem appears in the model when two resulting observations are related which will affect the validity of the model as the independent variables will affect the dependent variables in a high degree because of that correlation. To test the presence of that correlation [Durbin Watson (D-W)] test was used. Table 4 indicates that D-W for the study model is not located in the range between 1.5 and 2.5 which means that there is a positive correlation in the study model (Gujrati, 2003) . To overcome this problem ag (-1) was used when testing the study models. 
Homoscedasticity test
Once using linear regression model and ordinary least squares (OLS), variance of the random error should be constant and the average of it should be equivalent to zero, it is when the model is said to have homoscedasticity (Gujrati, 2003) . On the other hand, if the variance is not constant, the model is known to have heteroscedasticity, therefore, other statistical methods can be used to overcome and mend this complication; using for instance the White test which is effective automatically when its spotted while using a program such as E-views. In Table 4 , the p-value for white test appears to be more than 0.05 (0.367) which indicates that the study model has heteroscedasticity. However, this complication will be mended using white test.
Descriptive analysis
As mentioned earlier, the six principals of corporate governance used in this research were analysed through dummy variables. 
Descriptive analysis of corporate governance
The first principal of governance is the ownership of the largest shareholder. According to the analysis, only 12 listed companies out of 41 had their shareholders with less than 20% ownership of total shares which makes it a percentage of 29.3%. While on the other hand, 70.7% of the listed companies had their shareholders with ownership of over 20%. The results prove that listed companies in Bahrain are controlled by certain individuals as it was noticed that some directors and chairman had the same position on the board of other listed companies. The second principal relates to the size of the board of directors which should be between 7-13 shareholders on board. The analysis show us that 33 out 41 companies had number of directors between 7-13, while only 8 listed companies had either more than 13 or below 7 directors. A board of 7-13 directors can only be reasonable, as the greater the number gets, the harder it becomes to vote and take vital decisions. Ownership of the three largest shareholders of all listed companies were analysed and results show that 17 companies with a percentage of 41.5% had their major three shareholders with ownership less than 50%, while the remaining 24 companies had otherwise which makes it a percentage of 58.5%. The results demonstrate a control by those individuals holding over 50% of shares which could impact the Bourse and the share prices badly say if they all decide to sell their shares at once; a scenario that could actually happen. The fourth principal concerns the independency of the board of directors. The principal suggests that 50% or more of the total directors must be positioned as independent to the company. The study analysis shows that only 12 listed companies (29.3%) applied the principal, while the remaining 29 companies had less than 50% independent directors on board. Having a percentage of 70.7% of companies with less than 50% independent shareholders abroad may adversely affects disclosure and transparency and could be a possible reason for conflict of interest. The fifth principal concerns the separation in roles of the CEO and the chairman. According to the analysis, all listed companies had a separate appointed person in charge for the position of the CEO and the chairman. It is also important to mention that some listed companies had a general manager (GM) appointed on behalf of the CEO, however, in the absence of the CEO, the GM can be considered at the same level of the CEO (Andrews, 2008) . The Chairman holds critical decisions in hand and a powerful influence over the board, therefore the separation between chairman and CEO roles can lead to an effective board (Bouaziz, 2014) . Khiari and Kara (2013) argued that if the chairman and CEO wore the same hat, it could lead to conflict of interests and hence disclosed information will no longer be sincere. The property of managers is the sixth and last principal which means that the company should provide its senior managers with a percentage of shares between 1-20%. According to the analysis, only one listed company out of 41 applied the principal which is a very insignificant percentage of 2.4%, while the remaining 40 listed companies either did not provide their senior managers with ownership shares or provided a percentage less than 1%. Providing managers with a decent percentage of ownership in the company can prevent conflict of interest problems as well as increase the quality of performance and provide more transparency as everyone's interests become parallel. It was noticed that listed companies in Bahrain Bourse provided their managers with less than 1% of shares apart from one company only. The independence of board of directors, duality of chairman and CEO posts and the property of management principals are very critical in limiting the agency costs (Tehranian, 2002) .
Descriptive analysis of voluntary disclosure
As mentioned earlier in the methodology, the voluntary disclosure index was categorised into three categories; corporate environment (labelled V1), social responsibility (labelled V2) and financial information (labelled V3). The data collected was converted into ratios based on Al-Shammari study conducted in 2008. Referring to Table 6 , the first category (V1) had a minimum ratio of 0.120 and a maximum ratio of 0.760; the mean and standard deviation were found to be 0.490 and 0.158 respectively. The results show a not very high variance between the minimum and maximum values. This category included 25 indicators of the companies' corporate environment in which information regarding the board of director's education, meetings, remunerations and other related information was examined. It was noticed that over half of the listed companies disclosed the companies' minutes of meetings and director's attendance, also, most of them disclosed the board of director's education and previous experiences as well as an explanation of the company's structure. On the other hand, only a small portion of the listed companies disclosed information regarding director's remunerations and strategy statement. The second category (V2) had a minimum ratio of 0 and a maximum ratio of 1. The mean and standard deviation were found to be 0.317 and 0.322 respectively which indicate a great variance between the minimum and maximum results.
This category contained six indicators concerning the social responsibility of the company. It was noticed that over 50% of listed companies disclosed information regarding their charitable activities and donations; also, a decent number of companies disclosed information regarding educational and other sponsorships as well as community programs, however, very few companies were transparent about student's internships. The third category of (V3) had a minimum ratio of 0 and a maximum ratio of 1 as well. The mean and standard deviation for this category were found to be 0.725 and 0.163 respectively which indicates a medium variance between the highest and lowest values found. This category included 8 categories concerning financial information. The companies were found pretty transparent about their profitability and liquidity ratios, but lacked transparency when it came to growth rate on earnings. Generally speaking, the minimum value of voluntary disclosure ratio was found to be 0.04 while the maximum ratio was found to be 0.837. The mean and standard deviation were found to be 0.511 and 0.172 respectively which indicate a moderate variance between values. Table 7 summarises the descriptive statistics of the study variables. The independent variable which is corporate governance was divided into two categories; firms with high corporate governance and firms with low corporate governance based on the value of the calculated median which was found to be 50%, and thus was compared with companies' degree of voluntary disclosure along with the control variables. Through Table 7 , it is noticed that a number of firms were divided into firms with high corporate governance in which their median was found to be over 50%, while firms with low corporate governance had a median of less than 50%. Both the mean and standard deviation were calculated for both categories for the dependent variable (voluntary disclosure) and control variables (company size, financial leverage, company age, big four and market capitalisation). To ascertain the significance in the variance between the means of the two samples, t-test was performed . The first category of voluntary disclosure which revolves around the corporate environment (V1) was found to be higher with companies with high corporate governance, in other words, companies with highly implemented corporate governance tend to disclose more information regarding their corporate environment. The second category which is the social responsibility (V2) was also found to be higher with companies with highly implemented Corporate Governance, and finally the third category which is the financial information (V3) also tend to be higher with highly implemented corporate governance. In general, listed companies in Bahrain Bourse with highly implemented corporate governance tend to disclose more information regarding their corporate environment, social responsibility information as well as their financial information in order to attract more investors and most importantly to lessen conflict of interest between stakeholders and shareholders through disclosing and unifying information to all shareholders and not only those large shareholders dominating on others and are able to get some inside critical information which can affect everyone's investment and financial decisions. Moving on the control variables; the first variable analysed was the company size where it is noticed from Table 7 that companies with low corporate governance are the big sized companies, while companies with high corporate governance are the small sized companies. Small companies tend to have better control in general due to their small size and absence of complications; therefore they tend to have higher control and focus over the implementation of corporate governance. The second variable analysed was the financial leverage which can be noticed from the calculated mean that companies with low corporate governance have higher debt while companies with high corporate governance tend to have less debt. Companies with high corporate governance are believed to have lower debt ratios as they tend to lean towards transparency and the usage of their own revenues and sources to finance themselves instead of turning to other financial institutions.
Advanced descriptive analysis: path analysis
Moving on to the third variable analysed which is the firms' age in the market since the establishment. It is noticed from Table 7 that companies with high corporate governance are those newly or recently established, and those with low corporate governance have been sticking around a while longer in the market. It is likely for old companies to find it difficult to cope and adapt to the changes of the new principals of corporate governance announced during 2010 in the Kingdom of Bahrain, unlike those newly established companies which were established based on the new principals. The analysis was found to be significant with a Sig. of 0.018 which is less than 0.050.
Companies and financial institutions audited by one of the big four auditing companies are noticed to have high corporate governance unlike those audited by any other auditing company which were found to have low corporate governance. The big four auditing companies are known to be more strict and firm when it comes to complying with IFRS and the companies' commercial Law. The last of the control variables analysed was market capitalisation. Results show that companies with high corporate governance have higher market capitalisation and worth more in the market, while those with low corporate governance are noticed to have lower market capitalisation. Companies with a high market value tend to perform better and therefore attract more investors and gain their trust; moreover, those companies are likely to have a better and trustworthy reputation in the market. Using the independent sample t-test, the path analysis of the study was found to be insignificant as Sig. was found to be more than 0.050, apart from the company's age which had a sig. equal to 0.018 which proves the analysis of the study to be significant.
Empirical analysis
After validating the data of the study using statistical tests in order to ensure that it applies along with the conditions of applying GLM and OLS, and as the data used is cross sectional for the financial year 2013 with a sample size of 41 listed companies in Bahrain Bourse; the study hypothesis may be tested as follows based on the pooled regression, as shown in Table 8 .
As shown in Table 8 , the R calculated appears to be 67.9% which represents the percentage of the correlation between the independent, dependent and control variables. The degree of impact of independent variables and control variables on voluntary disclosure (R-square) is 46.1% which is the degree of changes of the dependent variables caused by the independent and control variables. The p-value (F-statistics) calculated is 0.022 which is less than 0.050 which determines that the study model is acceptable and therefore the study hypothesis can be concluded. The study hypothesis aims to measure the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in the listed companies in Bahrain Bourse, the corporate governance was observed to have either a positive relationship with voluntary disclosure or no relationship whatsoever. Supported by the agency theory; voluntary disclosure decreases when managers in organisations start acting for their own beneficial interest which in turn leads to increasing agency problems and conflicts between managers and shareholders and therefore lead to incurring agency costs (Bouaziz, 2014, Saha and Akter, 2011) . Disclosure is considered a highly important element in corporate governance as it helps building trust and attracts more investors as well as ensuring a smooth running of the capital markets (Dumitraşcu et al., 2015) . Table 8 Empirical results F-Critical (df for denominator n -β -1 = 41 -9 -1 = 31) and (df for numerator = β = 9 and confidence level of 99% is 4.57 and confidence level of 95% is 2.86 and confidence level of 10% is 2.25. Significance at: *10%; ** 5% and ***1% levels.
Regression model
Ownership of the largest shareholder and voluntary disclosure
According to Table 8 , the t-test of 3.335 shows a positive relationship with a sig. of 0.001 which is less than 0.050 which proves the hypothesis to be significant. Thus based on the results, the study accepts the alternative hypothesis; there is a positive relationship between the ownership of the largest shareholder principal and voluntary disclosure. Clearly when the ownership of the largest shareholders is less than 20%, this means that the distribution of shares is diverse and varied, therefore disclosing information is a must as the higher the number of shareholders, the less percentage of shares owned by an individual, hence the more is the demand on disclosure (Bouaziz, 2014) .
Size of the board of directors and voluntary disclosure
The t-test calculated for the second sub hypothesis appears to be 2.820 with a significance of 0.008 which is less than 0.050. Based on those results, it can be concluded that the size of the board of directors principal being between 7-13 members has a positive relationship with voluntary disclosure; therefore, the study accepts the alternative hypothesis. It is believed that a smaller board is able to direct and make better decisions and that a larger board size may lead to less information transparency (Chen and Jaggi, 2000) . Previous studies such as Rouf (2010) and Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) have also found a positive, significant relationship between the size of the board of directors and voluntary disclosure.
Ownership of the three largest shareholders and voluntary disclosure
The study hypothesis appears to have a t-test of -0.856 and a sig. of 0.399 which is more than 0.050 which implies that there is no relationship between the ownership of the three largest shareholders principal and voluntary disclosure, as well as being insignificant; therefore, the study rejects the alternative hypothesis.
If the three largest shareholders in the organisation hold shares with a total sum exceeding 50%, this means that those three are monopolising and controlling the organisation, thus controlling what's to be disclosed and what is not.
Independency of board of directors and voluntary disclosure
The fourth and last sub hypothesis appears to have a t-test statistics of 2.847 and a sig. of 0.004 which is less than 0.050. The results proves that there's a positive relationship between the independency of board of directors principal and voluntary disclosure as well as being significant, thus, the study accepts the alternative hypothesis. Consequently, after accepting three out of four sub alternative hypotheses, hence the study accepts the alternative hypothesis and therefore concludes that there is a positive relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in the listed companies in Bahrain Bourse.
Testing the effect of control variables on voluntary disclosure
Company size
The findings of the study contradict previous studies as Table 8 shows a negative relationship between the company size and voluntary disclosure with a t-test of -0.865. However, the study appears to be insignificant with sig. equal to 0.394 which is more than 0.050. A logical explanation for the findings is that small sized companies might find it less costly to disclose information to the public, while on the other hand; companies with material amounts of assets might find disclosing information pretty expensive. Khodadadi et al. (2010) , Saha and Akter (2013) have found a positive significant relationship between the firm size and voluntary disclosure, which contradicts the findings of the current study.
Financial leverage
According to the study results, the financial leverage appears to have a positive relationship with voluntary disclosure with a t-test of 1.622, however the study appears to be insignificant with sig. equals to 0.115 which is more than 0.050. As companies financial debts increase, creditors feel the urge to demand for more information in order to feel more secure, therefore, the higher the debt the higher the voluntary disclosure. Many previously conducted studies have used the agency theory to prove a positive relationship between the financial leverage and voluntary disclosure (Alsaeed, 2006; Abdullah and Ismail, 2008) .
Company age
The company's age as shown in Table 8 appears to have a negative association with voluntary disclosure with T-test equal to -0.624 but not significant as sig. 0.537 which is more than 0.050. The previous results could be due to the fact that young companies are able to organise information much easier than those that been around for a while, and thus are able to easily disclose information. Also, new companies tend to be modern and up to date, therefore are able to appreciate the necessity of voluntary disclosure, unlike old companies that find it difficult to change. Uyar et al. (2013) and Alsaeed (2006) have also found an insignificant relationship between firms' age and voluntary disclosure.
Big four
The auditors' type appears to have a positive relationship with Voluntary Disclosure according to test results, as Table 8 show a -test of 1.522, however the study appears to be insignificant with sig. equals to 0.139 which is more than 0.050. The quality of auditor enhances and improves the quality of disclosure (Al-Janadi et al., 2013) . The results prove that the big four auditing companies in Bahrain are more independent than other auditing firms and are able to impact listed companies in Bahrain Bourse to disclose more information. Al-Janadi (2013), Gandia (2008) and Khodadadi et al., (2010) have also found a positive relationship between the type of auditor and disclosure. Table 8 shows a positive association between market capitalisation and voluntary disclosure but insignificant with a t-test equals to 1.287 and Sig. 0.208. The explanation of the prior results is: the higher the companies' value in the market, the higher its audiences, stakeholders and shareholders which will increase the demand on more information, thus the company has no other choice but to disclose more information to the public.
Market capitalisation
Conclusions, limitations, implications of the study and recommendations
Conclusions
The main objective of the study was to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure through the listed companies in Bahrain Bourse. The study also aimed to measure the level of compliance of companies in Bahrain Bourse with the corporate governance, as well as measure the level of voluntary disclosure by those firms. The study was based on the agency theory which suggests that a system must be present in order to cease and lessen the agency costs arising from self-beneficial acts and decisions by managers which in turn create conflicts, raise agency costs and therefore agency problems. The presence of the corporate governance code can help regulate organisations and thus increase the level of disclosure. Many studies were conducted measuring the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in the region and outside the region such as in the USA (Saha and Akter, 2011), Canada (2014) , France (2013 ), Malaysia (2009 ), Spain (2008 , Bangladesh (2013) , Kuwait (2008 and , UAE (2012) , Iran (2010) and Saudi Arabia (2013). The sample size of the study was 41 listed companies in Bahrain Bourse with the exclusion of four non-Bahraini companies and two closed companies. Collecting the data from the investors' guide published by Bahrain Bourse and the annual reports published by those listed companies; two conditions were developed: all information should be available and no company was merged with another or liquidated during the period of the study. Corporate governance was measured as the independent variable using dummy variables with six different principals known as: ownership of shareholders should not exceed 20%; the size of the board of directors should be in between 7-13 board members; company's three largest shareholders shouldn't be more than 50%; board of directors should be controlled by over 50% independent outside directors; duties of the CEO and the chairman should be separated; and finally property manager in the firms' shares should be between 1 to 20 (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Barros et al., 2013; Bouaziz, 2014) . Voluntary disclosure was determined to be the dependent variable using a disclosure index used in many previous studies (such as: Al-Shammari, 2008; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan 2010; Barros, 2013; Bouaziz, 2014) . The measurement was also done using dummy variables and the index was adjusted in order to suit the business environment in Bahrain. The index included three categories in which they are: corporate environment, social responsibility and financial information. The study also took into consideration five different control variables in which they are: the company's size, financial leverage, company's age, big four and market capitalisation.
A regression model was estimated in order to measure the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure taking into consideration the control variables. After testing the regression model, the study findings can be summarised as follows: companies with high corporate governance are small sized companies as they tend to have better controlling mechanism over themselves. The study was found to be insignificant. It was noticed that companies with high corporate governance have less financial debt as they depend more on their revenues and net profits of the year without feeling the need to borrow from other financial institutions. Young companies were noticed to have higher corporate governance than those old ones as it is easier for them to cope with changes being already established on the new rules. Companies with high corporate governance are associated with being audited by one of the big four auditing firms. The big four auditing firms are known for being firm when it comes to applying rules and enhance information transparency. Companies with high corporate governance tend to have higher market capitalisation which is likely since the higher the company's value the better it performs and the more it attracts investors and gains their trust. Information disclosure regarding the corporate environment was found to be higher when the company has high corporate governance. As it was noticed, information regarding the boards' education and experience was disclosed as well as information regarding the minutes of meetings. Information disclosure regarding the social responsibility of the company also tends to be higher when the company has high corporate governance. It was observed that over 50% of listed firms were disclosing information regarding their community programs, sponsorships and funding of social events. Information disclosure regarding the financial information was found to be higher when the company has high corporate governance. Listed firms were noticed to be transparent regarding their profit and liquidity ratios as well as the distributed cash and stock dividends. The listed companies in Bahrain Bourse were found to be more transparent when corporate governance is high, however, the study was not found to be significant. Voluntary disclosure was not found to be at an acceptable level in Bahrain Bourse listed companies. Despite the study result, listed companies in Bahrain are considered to be transparent compared to previous studies as the voluntary disclosure was found to be 51.1%. Despite the study results, the voluntary disclosure percentage in Bahrain Bourse listed companies wasn't considered bad compared to previously conducted study. It gives investors a good indicator to how transparent the companies are. The results were also found to be a possible key to an open economy, growth and a promising essential financial position in the region for the Kingdom of Bahrain. Corporate governance was not found to be at an acceptable level in Bahrain Bourse listed companies. Corporate governance in Bahrain bourse listed companies was found to be 47.1% which is considered a good percentage compared to the new corporate governance culture in Bahrain and previous studies. There is a significant positive relationship between ownership of the largest shareholder and voluntary disclosure. There is a significant positive relationship between size of the board of directors and voluntary disclosure. There is no relationship between ownership of the three largest shareholders and voluntary disclosure. Duality of chairman and CEO was excluded from the analysis as the principal was found to be 100% complied in Bahrain Bourse. Property of managers was excluded from the analysis as the principal was found to be 99% complied. The company size was found to have a negative relationship with voluntary disclosure as some companies find it costly to disclose information. Financial leverage was found to have a positive relationship with voluntary disclosure. As the company's debt increase, investors feel the need for more information in order to feel more secure. Stakeholders might make new decisions based on the information disclosed. The company age appeared to have a negative association with voluntary disclosure. Younger companies are thought to be more organised when it comes to information hence they find it easier to disclose information unlike older companies. The auditors' type whether it's a big four company or not was found to have a positive relationship with voluntary disclosure. It is likely that the big four auditing firms and their quality of service will assure better implementation of corporate governance and the disclosure of information. Market capitalisation had a positive association with voluntary disclosure as the higher the company is valued in the market, the higher the number of shareholders and stakeholders, therefore the higher will be the demand on disclosure.
Recommendations
The study recommends that corporate governance code to be strictly regulated in the Kingdom of Bahrain and assure that all listed and unlisted companies are implementing it. Shareholders, investors, creditors and debtors are recommended to increase their knowledge with the term voluntary disclosure and its critical importance in the business world and the market in order to make better investment and other related decisions.
Bahrain Bourse in recommended to develop a corporate governance index for listed companies for the use and access of investors and researchers as well as an online database for listed companies published financial data and other related information in their annual reports.
Future studies and limitations
The future studies suggested by the author is to conduct the same study based on other theories such as the stakeholders theory and organisational power in order to explain the relationship between governance and disclosure, as well as using a panel data methodology instead of cross-sectional. Moreover, it is also suggested to broaden the study area into the GCC region instead of only the Kingdom of Bahrain. It is also a good idea to research the relationship between voluntary disclosure and the financial performance of listed companies in Bahrain Bourse. Studying the impact of corporate governance on creative accounting in Bahrain Bourse listed companies is an interesting area to research, as creative accounting is becoming more popular these days and could be considered a type of fraud (Donwa and Odia, 2013) . Conducting the current study was not without any limitations. Firstly, Kingdom of Bahrain is considered a relatively small country, thus to have 47 companies listed in the Bourse is considered a very small sample compared to other countries and financial markets. Another limitation is the cross-sectional data methodology employed for the study as well as using the financial information and annual reports of the year 2013 instead of 2014 since the study was conducted in the early stages of the year 2015 where most of audit reports were not published yet. Finally, the absence of an online database by the Bahrain Bourse caused the data to be collected manually through visiting 41 different sites in order to download and go over 41 different annual reports.
Implication of the study
Many previous studies were conducted to measure the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure that supported by different theories, had different sample sizes as well as different models. Conducting this study in the Kingdom of Bahrain is a first and the statistical results concluded are to benefit investors, shareholders, managers, creditors, debtors and other stakeholders taking wiser financial decisions and be aware of the Bahrain Bourse. 
